Jihad online : how do terrorists use the internet? by Cohen-Almagor, Raphael.
1 
8. 
Jihad online: how do terrorists use the Internet? 
Raphael Cohen-Almagor1 
University of Hull (United Kingdom) 
R.Cohen-Almagor@hull.ac.uk  
This is a pre-copyedited version of a contribution published in Francisco Campos 
Freire,  Xosé Rúas Araújo, Valentín Alejandro Martínez Fernández, and Xosé López 
García (eds.), Media and Metamedia Management (Dordrecht: Springer, 2017), pp. 
55-66. The definitive authenticated version is available online via https://
doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46068-0
Abstract: 
Terrorism is designed to attract attention to the terrorist’s cause and to spread fear and 
anxiety among wide circles of the targeted population. This paper provides information 
about the ways terrorists are using the Internet. The threat of terrorism is real and 
significant. As the Internet became a major arena for modern terrorists, we need to 
understand how modern terrorism operates and devise appropriate methods to 
forestall such activities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to update and supplement my 2012 paper (Cohen-Almagor, 
2012) about the ways radical, terrorist Islamists exploit the Internet. Modern terrorism is 
diffused into cells in different parts of the world. The Internet plays a crucial part in 
maintaining connections between those cells. Indeed the Internet is a multipurpose tool 
and weapon. It brings together like-minded people and creates a forum for them to 
discuss and exchange ideas. The Internet has been exploited by terrorists to deliver 
instructions and plans, to prepare dangerous operations and to launch violent attacks 
on designated targets. 
2. HOW DO TERRORISTS USE THE INTERNET
Information – Terrorist organizations share knowledge globally via the Internet. 
Information on sensitive targets and potential state weaknesses can be easily attained 
via the communication systems. Google Earth covers major parts of the globe. Hamas 
was said to use Google Earth to plan its operations (Tamimi, 2007). Al-Qaeda 
maintains a database that contains information about potential American targets 
(Thornton, 2010; Coolsaet, 2011; Neumann, 2012). Public transport routes and 
timetables, maps of building sites, their opening times and their layout are readily 
available. The Internet can also be used to disclose code names and radio frequencies 
used by security services.  
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Propaganda and Indoctrination – The Al-Qaeda and ISIS networks have been 
successful in their use of audio-visual propaganda, producing pre-recorded videotapes, 
computer games and music in order to spread radical ideology and to reach 
sympathizers across the globe (Gruen, 2006; UNODC, 2012). ISIS strictly monitors the 
Internet and media in places under its control to ensure its dominance. An internal US 
State Department assessment from 2015 held that the Islamic State’s violent narrative 
— promulgated through thousands of messages each day — has been winning the 
social media propaganda warfare (Mazzetti & Gordon, 2015).  
On jihadi websites, the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York were displayed 
as part of an assault on the U.S. economy. There are video clips on YouTube that 
encourage the launch of attacks and suicide bombing. Some include English 
translation (Thomas, 2003). Other images show how Muslims are being victimized by 
American, British and Israeli and Western soldiers while yet others show images of 
jihadi bravery, how jihadists kill and maim their enemies. 
Already in 1996, Babar Ahmad – a twenty-two-year-old computer whiz and mechanical 
engineering student at Imperial College in London – launched a website called 
Azzam.com, in honor of Abdallah Azzam, the founder of Maktab al-Khidamat and the 
mentor to Osama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri. The site was dedicated to 
promoting Islamist fighters in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. It quickly became a 
prominent and influential platform for Islamist militants because it posted firsthand 
news reports from amateur correspondents around the world. International news 
organizations, including the BBC, often cited dispatches from Azzam.com and its sister 
websites when reporting on events in Chechnya and Afghanistan. According to 
terrorism expert Evan Kohlmann, this was the very first al-Qaeda website. Even in its 
nascency, it was professional. While it was not technically sophisticated, still it was 
professional looking, attracting the attention of jihadists (Forest, 2004a; Schmidt, 
2004). 
 
The Internet is used to target young people. Terrorist organizations use cartoons, 
popular music videos and computer games to get their attention (UNODC, 2012). In 
2003, Hezbollah began online promotion of a computer game simulating terrorist 
attacks on Israeli targets. The computer game, called Special Force, was developed by 
the Hezbollah Central Internet Bureau, and its development took two years. The game, 
played in Arabic, English, French and Farsi, was based on actual Hezbollah battles 
with Israeli forces. It placed the player in different Hezbollah operations against Israelis 
and players could gained points by killing Israeli leaders ( (Harnden, 2004). The game 
ended with an exhibit of Hezbollah “martyrs” – fighters killed by Israel. The message to 
users was: “Fight, resist and destroy your enemy in the game of force and victory” 
(WorldNetDaily, 2003). Mahmoud Rayya, a member of Hezbollah, noted in an interview 
for the Daily Star that the decision to produce the game was made by leaders of 
Hezbollah, and that “In a way, Special Force offers a mental and personal training for 
those who play it, allowing them to feel that they are in the shoes of the resistance 
fighters” (Íbid.).  
Today the prospect of establishing a Caliphate is appealing to thousands of jihadists. 
The slick Inspire magazine, published online in English, has become popular in jihadi 
circles (Lemieuz, Brachman, Levitt & Wood, 2014).  In May 2015, ISIS released the 
ninth issue of Dabiq, its online English- and multi-language magazine2. The magazine 
is opened with the following statement: 
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As the crusaders continue to reveal their intense hatred 
and animosity towards Islam through their relentless 
bombing and drone campaigns on the Islamic State, a 
new breed of crusader continues shedding light on the 
extent of their hatred towards the religion of truth. This 
breed of crusader aims to do nothing more than to anger 
the Muslims by mocking and ridiculing the best of 
creation, the Prophet Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdillāh (sallallāhu 
‘alayhi wa sallam), under the pretext of defending the idol 
of “freedom of speech”3. 
Thus, it is the duty of each and every good Muslim to support the cause of Allah and 
punish those who dare to insult the Prophet. Dabiq calls upon Muslims to carry their 
duty and perform the virtues of jihad.  
Networking – Jihadi websites enable like-minded people to engage in a power 
struggle against the western enemy (Atwan, 2006; AIVD, 2012). Jihadi forums provide 
them with friends and support. In the forums they share their fantasies and aspirations 
with their online friends. The networking and exchange provide them with a sense of 
belonging to a greater community with the common cause and benchmark of Islam. 
The forums prove the existence of the ummah, the Muslim nation (Sageman, 2008). 
Among the popular jihadi forums were/are: al-Qimmah, Atahadi, al-Jihad al-Alami, al-
Fajr, al-Furqan, al-Hanein, Al-Luyuth al-Islamiyyah, al-Maark, al-Malahem, al-Medad, 
al-Shamukh, at-Tahaddi, as-Ansar, Hanein, and The Mujahideen Electronic Network. 
Some of them are comprised of tens of thousands of people. www.shawati.com had 
more than 31,000 registered members. www.kuwaitchat.net had more than 11,000 
members (ICT, 2012; Qin, Zhou, Reid & Chen, 2008).  
A 2015 George Washington University report documents 71 people in the United 
States charged with crimes related to the Islamic State since March 2014: 40% were 
converts to Islam, defying any ethnic profile. They were young, with an average age of 
26; overwhelmingly American citizens or legal residents. 14% were women. Nearly all 
of them had spent hours on the Internet boasting their feelings about the Islamic State 
and engaging with English speakers from other countries. Nearly all of them were 
arrested after their online posts drew the attention of the F.B.I. (Shane, Apuzzo & 
Schmitt, 2015). Consider, for instance, Ali Amin, a 17-year-old Virginia resident who 
was gradually drawn into ISIS virtual world, associated with other supporters and 
subsequently provided logistical support to ISIS, instructing them how to transfer funds 
secretly and drove an ISIS recruit to the airport (Posner 2015). 
Psychological warfare – The internet is a major tool for terrorists to bypass 
mainstream media sources when attempting to use psychological warfare. Al-Qaeda 
and ISIS regularly publish videos that are designed to evoke fear. al-Qaeda's media 
department as-Sahab (“the Clouds”)4  produced Osama bin-Laden audio and video 
tapes (Stratfor, 2006), aiding Al-Qaeda in its international propaganda campaign. 
Another jihadi media organization, Al-Fajr Media Center, turned insurgency into a 
courageous journey, mayhem and violence into inspiring music videos5. There are 
thousands of jihadi-terrorist publications and videos that show gore and violence, 
hostage taking, suicide bombings, bomb explosions, operation tactics and religious 
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radical oratory inciting bloody jihad (Salem, Reid & Chen, 2008; Lappin, 2011; 
Lemieuz, Brachman, Levitt & Wood, 2014)6.  
In May 2004, the shocking video of al-Zarqawi decapitating Nicholas Berg was 
downloaded millions of times on the Internet and stimulated copycat beheadings by 
other groups (Nye, 2005). At some point, leaders of al-Qaeda felt that the beheadings 
videos had exhausted their impact and stopped producing them. Part of the terrorist 
tactics is to surprise by changing the mode of operations. Much like changes in 
fashion, terrorists decide on the most appropriate method for a given time and once 
they feel that the method is exhausted, they will opt for another fashionable tactics. 
Thus, at one point they may opt for hijacking or bombing airplanes. Then they may 
resort to suicide bombings, to hostage taking, to planting bombs in strategic places, to 
launching attacks on civilians, to rocket fire, or to cyberterror. They may mix their 
methods, and at the same time may highlight their “signature” method to serve as a 
tactical contagion point for their followers. In 2014, ISIS has turned to make itself 
radically distinct from other jihadi organizations by their shocking and revolting group 
beheadings.  
The Palestinian issue is a global concern, facilitated by the Internet far more than it 
does by conventional media. Jihad Online was a high profile, Arabic language, 
Palestinian jihad-oriented site, synthesized Islamic Jihad and pro-Palestinian 
ideologies. It posted photos of shahid suicide murderers. The site was created in 2002 
and was registered in Beirut (Bunt, 2003). Laskar Jihad, based in Jakarta, was 
allegedly connected with al-Qaeda, and proactively applied the Internet as a means of 
disseminating its ideology in Indonesian and English. The site was regularly updated 
with news, articles and photographs. The site contained details of the organization’s 
paramilitary activities in the Moluccan Islands against Christian population (Bunt, 
2003).  
Socialization and motivation –Those who become violent jihadis can be divided into 
four main groups: Truth seekers, identity seekers, revenge seekers, and thrill seekers. 
Those jihadists are emotionally-driven by images from Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine, 
where Muslims suffer humiliation inflicted on them by western powers, and by images 
of terror attacks carried out in Europe and in the United States (Rosen, 2006; Kern, 
2015). 
Security expert Thomas Hegghammer distinguished between the jihadi “mother sites” 
and the jihadi Internet message boards. The “mother sites” are run by people who get 
their material directly from the ideologues or operatives. On the jihadi Internet message 
boards one could find the political and religious discussions among the sympathizers 
and potential recruits. Among the most important message boards for al-Qaeda 
sympathizers were al Qal’ah (the Fortress), al Sahat (the Fields), and al Islah (Reform). 
Those message boards provided links to the “information hubs,” where new radical-
Islamists texts, declarations, and recordings were posted. Those hubs existed in the 
“communities” sections of Yahoo!, Lycos, and other popular Internet gateways (Wright, 
2004). 
Fund raising – Funding is essential for terrorist operations. Terrorist organizations 
raise funds via the Internet by making email appeals or through their websites; by 
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selling goods through their websites; through associated side businesses; through 
fraud, gambling, or online brokering (Gruen, 2004; Guiora, 2011); and through online 
organizations that resemble humanitarian charity groups. ISIS revenues come primarily 
from oil, from major donors, from their extensive criminal enterprises, and from small 
donations (Levitt, 2014). 
Hizb ut-Tahir has established websites from Europe to Africa that ask supporters to 
assist the cause of jihad. Like those sponsored by fighters in Chechnya, the websites 
displayed numbered bank accounts to which supporters could contribute. Another 
example of terrorist fund-raising on the Internet comes from Lashkar e-Tayba (LeT), 
one of the most violent terrorist groups in Kashmir, serving as the terrorist wing of the 
Markaz Dawa-Wal-Irshad, an Islamic fundamentalist organization of the Wahhabi sect 
in Pakistan 7  (Cline, 2008; Subhani, 1996). It is a well-organized and well-funded 
terrorist group that has trained thousands of mujahedeen, sending them to 
Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and the Philippines (Weimann, 
2006a: 137). 
Spreading tactics – Instructions and online manuals – In 2004, al-Qaeda issued a 
chilling manual directed at new volunteers who were “below the radar” of counter-
terrorist authorities and who could not undergo formal training in terrorist techniques. 
The manual encouraged the use of weapons of mass destruction (Burke, 2004). Al-
Battar (‘the sharp-edged sword’) was an online al-Qaeda journal that appeared 
regularly since 2003. It served as a virtual training camp, providing readers with 
instruction in weapons handling, explosives, kidnapping, poisoning, cell organization, 
guerrilla warfare, secure communications, physical fitness, the making a suicide-bomb 
belt (even down to the correct thickness of the cloth), how to plant land mines, how to 
detonate a bomb remotely with a mobile phone, topography, orientation (including 
crossing a desert at night), map reading and survival skills (Atwan, 2006; Kennedy, 
2006; Spencer, 2004). The courses were accompanied by statements and speeches of 
al-Qaeda leaders. Would be jihadis were urged to follow the virtual courses at home or 
in groups, practice the instructions, obtain firearms and maintain a high level of fitness 
in preparation for taking steps to join the mujahedin.  
Some of the issues focused on single, important issues. For instance, the September 
2004 issue of Al-Battar8 focused on how to properly conduct kidnapping operations. It 
provided detailed instructions as to requirements for conducting kidnapping, stages of 
public kidnapping, how to deal with hostages, and what security measures should the 
kidnappers take (Al-Muqrin, 2004). Al-Qaeda Targeting Guidance specifies types of 
targets inside cities, economic targets, the purpose of human targets, the advantages 
and disadvantages of operation against cities (Intelcenter, 2004). 
Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, known as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, wrote The Global Islamic 
Resistance Call. This sort of strategist/ideological 1,600-page magnum opus, was 
written over a two-year research. This meticulous study draws on the experience of 
prior conflicts to explain how global terror network should organize, finance, recruit, 
train and operate. The Call gives practical instructions for mass murder and urges 
wannabe jihadists to act independently. It is aimed to transform al-Qaeda from a 
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terrorist network into a truly global movement of individuals organized in small cells 
(“detachments”), thus making the movement impermeable to U.S. and allied 
counterterrorism efforts. According to Nasar, the key to jihadi success is to make the 
global terror network looser, meaner and more resilient. In order to defeat the United 
States, jihad should spread to all parts of the world and recruit far more warriors. The 
fighting should be conducted in three stages, each stage with the appropriate weapons 
and guerrilla warfare methods. The first stage is of exhaustion which includes 
assassinations, raiding, ambushes and explosion operations. This is followed by the 
balancing stage, where the jihadis move to great strategic attacks with great battles. 
Finally, the stage of decisiveness and liberation after some sectors of the army join the 
guerrilla warriors and bring Muslim victory (Al-Suri, 2007). 
The manuals were put into use. Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Hasib 
Hussain and Jermaine Lindsay who were responsible for the death of 56 people and 
the injury of some 700 others on July 7, 2005 downloaded the instructions on how to 
build their bombs from the Internet (Hewitt, 2008; Cohen-Almagor, 2012). 
Many password-protected forums refer to extensive literature on explosives. Tutorials 
provide insights on viruses, hacking stratagems, encryption methods, anonymity 
guidelines, and use of secret codes. Bomb-making knowledge is available on jihadi 
websites in the form of detailed, step-by-step video instructions showing how to build 
improvised explosive devices. Online instructions played a critical role in the March 
2004 Madrid bombings, the April 2005 Khan al-Khalili bombings in Cairo, the July 2006 
failed attempt to bomb trains in Germany, the June 2007 plot to bomb London’s West 
End and Glasgow, and the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, in which Dzhokhar 
and Tamerlan Tsarnaev allegedly placed pressure cookers close to the finish line 
(Sageman, 2008; Dastagir, 2013; Weimann, 2014a; Weimann, 2014b). 
In addition to manuals and diagrams, training videos are common among terrorist 
websites. For example, in early June 2005, a contributor to the militant Arabic language 
web forum Tajdid Al-Islami posted a series of training videos for beginner mujahideen 
that included discussions on basic fitness, ninja arts, proper uniform, and 
communication techniques. As a follow-up, in August 2005, the contributor posted a 
seven-part lesson on how to use a handheld, portable global positioning system (GPS) 
receiver (Forest, 2004b). 
Arms Trade – Terrorist organizations are using social networking sites to buy 
weapons. Facebook has been hosting online arms bazaars, offering weapons ranging 
from handguns and grenades to heavy machine guns and guided missiles. The 
weapons include many distributed by the United States to security forces and their 
proxies in the Middle East. These online bazaars have been appearing in regions 
where the Islamic State has its strongest presence (Chivers, 2016). A recent report 
documented 97 attempts at unregulated transfers of missiles, heavy machine guns, 
grenade launchers, rockets and rifles, used to disable military equipment, through 
several Libyan Facebook groups since September 2014 (Jenzen & Rice, 2016). 
Recruitment – Online recruiting has increased exponentially due to the increased 
popularity of social networking sites. They attract interested jihadists who play a critical 
role in identifying potential radicals and alert about suspected others (Kunt, 2006; 
Witte, Markon & Hussain, 2009). The Islamic State has published videos to help in its 
recruitment of foreign fighters, some of these videos in the form of hyped music clips: 
come to ISIS-controlled territory; fight for the cause; kill the infidels and feel great about 
death. Allah promises virgins and violence (The Clarion Project, 2015). 
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Ziyad Khalil’s path to terror is illustrative. Khalil enrolled in a computer science course 
in Columbia College in 1995. He became a Muslim activist in college and created a 
number of radical websites. At some point, his activities were noticed by al-Qaeda. 
Later Khalil became the organization’s procurement officer in the USA (Verton, 2003). 
He bought a satellite phone used by Osama bin Laden to plot the 1998 bombings of 
U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya9. 
In recent years we witness thousands of jihadists who volunteer to fight for ISIS. 
Information gathered about those people show that there is no one unifying explanation 
for their endeavour. Many are genuinely committed to the Caliphate project. Some of 
them are pious while others are not. Many have troubled histories while others would 
have had good prospects had they stayed in their countries. Some were driven by the 
humanitarian suffering of their brethren (say the Syrian people who rebel against the 
Assad dictatorship) while others were seeking thrill and adventure (Neumann, 2015). 
Planning of activities and coordination – Al-Qaeda and ISIS have been using the 
Internet in planning and coordinating terror attacks. The prime example is the 
September 11, 2001 attack that prompted the “war on terror”. Thousands of code-word 
and encrypted messages that had been posted in a password-protected area of a 
website were found by federal officials on the computer of arrested al-Qaeda terrorist 
Abu Zubaydah (Weimann, 2006b; Cohen-Almagor, 2010). More recently, the NY Post 
(2013) revealed that American intelligence intercepted discussion on a jihadi website 
about launching attacks against American targets. Consequently, the USA closed 19 
diplomatic posts across Africa and the Middle East for more than a week. 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
Diffusion in terrorist locations is made possible by Internet communications. Jihadi 
texts and videos are available for people who seek such guidance. Extreme religious 
ideologies are spread through websites and videotapes accessible throughout the 
world (Bobbitt, 2008; Glasser & Coll, 2005). Great reverence is paid to the views of the 
militant leadership (Windrem, 2015). The digital legacy of the jihadist ideologue cleric 
Anwar al-Awlaki continues to inspire countless plots and attacks (Shane, 2015; 
Goodwin, 2015). Fatwas of religious sages legitimize and endorse violence. Already in 
2002 Middle East expert Paul Eedle had warned:  
The Website is central to al-Qaeda’s strategy to ensure 
that its war with the U.S. will continue even if many of its 
cells across the world are broken up and its current 
leaders are killed or captured. The site’s function is to 
deepen and broaden worldwide Muslim support, allowing 
al-Qaeda or successor organizations to fish for recruits, 
money and political backing. The whole thrust of the site, 
from videos glorifying September 11 to Islamic legal 
arguments justifying the killing of civilians, and even 
poetry, is to convince radical Muslims that, for decades, 
the U.S. has been waging a war to destroy Islam, and 
that they must fight back (Edle, 2002).  
Some Western Internet Service Providers and web-hosting companies have been 
hosting terrorist sites and helped the cause of jihad. Some do it knowingly while others 
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did it inadvertently. A British company, ServerSpace Ltd and American company Vault 
Network Ltd provide Internet services to Hezbollah’s www.almanar.com.lb. The French 
Desibox Sas provides Internet access to Hezbollah’s www.jihadbinaa.org. The French 
Online SAS and the American Servepath provide Internet services to Hezbollah’s 
www.almahdiscouts.net. The American HostGator LLC provides access to 
www.inbaa.com which is affiliated to the Hezbollah. American XLHost.com hosts 
Hezbollah’s www.alnour.com.lb. American Global Net Access Llc provides Internet 
services to Hezbollah’s www.alahednews.com.lb. American eNom Inc services 
Hezbollah’s www.alshahid.org. American ISP Gogrid Llc services Hezbollah’s 
http://www.aljarha.net (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 
2013). InfoCom Corporation in Texas hosted terrorist organizations and also served to 
launder money. Large amounts of money came from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states 
to sponsor Hamas activities (The Investigative Project on Terrorism, no date; Katz, 
2003; Whitetaker, 2001).  
According to the security senior officials and experts, blocking and shutting websites is 
not a viable option. What is required is more structure.10 YouTube, Facebook, Twitter 
and others have the technological abilities to scrutinize their servers to ensure that 
content that violate their terms of services (ToS) will not be posted. Terrorist content 
surely violates their ToS thus it should not be allowed publicity. What needed is 
awareness and a growing sense of social responsibility to put the capabilities into 
effect (Cohen-Almagor, 2015). Social responsibility should influence ISPs and web-
hosting companies to verify that they do not become hubs for terror. Socially 
responsible Internet intermediaries are opposed to terrorism. They understand that 
associating themselves with terror is bad for business. Unfortunately others either 
support terror or do not seem to care. The struggle is hard and long. The end of the 
battle of ideas between the ideology of destruction and the liberal ideologies of live-
and-let-live is not yet in sight. 
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